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COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE v. HAWKS: WHY FEDERAL 
COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO RECOGNIZE AND 
ENFORCE TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
NONMEMBERS “BECAUSE OF THE FEDERAL 






Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River are long, winding bodies of 
water found in Northwest Idaho.
1
 To the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, these waters 
are sacred and foundational to the Tribe’s culture.
2
 The lake and river make 
up part of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe Reservation and are partially owned by 
the Tribe.
3
 Because of the great reverence with which it views Lake Coeur 
d’Alene and the St. Joe River, the Tribe goes to great lengths to preserve 
the environmental integrity of the water.
4
 For example, the Tribe regulates 
the structural encroachments, such as private docks, on tribal waters.
5
  
At issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks was an encroachment on the 
St. Joe River placed by a husband and wife, the Hawkses, who are not 
members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
6
 Since the Hawkses did not follow 
tribal ordinances when installing a boat garage on the lake, the Tribe sued 
                                                                                                             
 *  Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 ** Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Many thanks to 
Professor Liesa Richter of the University of Oklahoma College of Law for her invaluable 
advice and support during the writing of this Note. 
 1. See Lake Management, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/lake/ 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020); see Saint Joe River, IDAHO DEP’T OF FISHING & GAME, 
https://idfg.idaho.gov/ifwis/fishingplanner/water/1168011474569 (last visited Sept. 19, 
2020). 
 2. See Goals of Regulation, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-
nsn.gov/lake/shoreline-protection/goals-of-regulation/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 3. See Map of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, 
https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/nr/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/fishfeereg.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2020); see History, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-
nsn.gov/our-tribe/history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020). 
 4. Lake Management, supra note 1. 
 5. Shoreline Protection, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/ 
lake/shoreline-protection/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 6. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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the couple in Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court.
7
 The tribal court entered a 
default judgment against the Hawkses because they failed to appear to 
defend against the Tribe’s claims.
8
 To ensure the removal of the violating 
encroachment, the Tribe filed a complaint in federal court seeking 
recognition and enforcement of the tribal court judgment.
9
  
When a court recognizes a judgment from another jurisdiction, it gives 
the outside judgment “the same effect that [the judgment] has in the 
[jurisdiction] where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject 
matter of the action and the issues involved.”
10
 A judgment from another 
jurisdiction is enforced when the prevailing party is given the relief granted 
by the court that originally rendered the judgment in the matter.
11
 This Note 
considers whether federal courts have the power, or jurisdiction, to hear a 
recognition and enforcement case such as Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks. 
This discussion does not venture far into whether, and under what 
circumstances, a court should recognize a tribal court judgment. Instead, the 
main focus remains on whether an “action to recognize and enforce a tribal 
court’s award against nonmembers of the tribe”
12
 is appropriate for 
resolution in the federal courts.  
Part I has served to broadly introduce Couer d’Alene Tribe and 
recognition and enforcement suits. Parts II and III of this Note discuss the 
foundational legal principles necessary to understand the analysis in Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe; particularly, these sections consider the subject matter 
jurisdiction requirements of federal courts and the process by which a 
foreign judgment may be recognized in a new forum. Part IV provides the 
significant caselaw established on this issue before Coeur d’Alene Tribe. In 
Parts V and VI, this Note explains the Ninth Circuit’s holding, assesses the 
court’s reasoning, and considers the implications of the decision. Finally, 
Part VII concludes that federal courts are authorized to recognize and 
enforce tribal court judgments against nonmember defendants. 
  
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. ch. 5, topic 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 
1971). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1053. 
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II. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts 
While state courts in the United States have broad jurisdiction to hear 
most kinds of legal disputes, federal courts have only limited jurisdiction.
13
 
Federal courts do not have general authority to make valid, legal judgments 
in many types of cases.
14
 Among a few other categories of cases, the U.S. 
Constitution grants authority to the Supreme Court to preside over cases 
“arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made . . . under their Authority.”
15
 In addition to the power given 
to the Supreme Court, the Constitution further devises power to the 
congressional branch “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court.”
16
 Therefore, Congress established the federal district and appellate 
courts
17
 and established the types of cases in which these federal courts can 
exercise jurisdiction.
18
 Federal district courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear most cases because of two federal statutes: 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1332.
19
 Section 1331 authorizes federal courts to make rulings 
in cases involving federal law.
20
 The other main jurisdictional authorization, 
§ 1332, permits federal courts to rule in cases involving U.S. citizens from 
different states, commonly called diversity jurisdiction.
21
 This Note focuses 
on the first-mentioned jurisdictional authorization in § 1331: federal 
question jurisdiction. 
 Cases considered “federal questions” involve claims that arise “under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
22
 In American Well 
Works v. Layne, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes provided a useful test to 
determine whether a suit arises under federal law; specifically, he reasoned 
that a federal question “arises under the law that creates the cause of 
action.”
23
 Thus, claims that properly invoke federal question jurisdiction are 
created by federal law.
24
 While this test is useful, it is not the only option a 
                                                                                                             
 13. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981). 
 14. See id. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 132; 28 U.S.C. § 43. 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 19. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); see 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331–1332. 
 20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 21. See id. § 1332. 
 22. Id. § 1331. 
 23. Am. Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 24. See id. 
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court has to resolve the issue of federal question jurisdiction.
25
 Another 
standard the Supreme Court has offered for federal question analysis is 
whether the case raises a substantial question of federal law.
26
 This standard 
was established in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., where a 
shareholder sued Kansas City Title & Trust to prevent it from violating its 
corporate charter.
27
 The company planned to invest in federal securities 
recently authorized by Congress.
28
 The shareholder claimed that the 
company’s intended investment would cause misappropriation of corporate 
funds because the federal securities were invalidly authorized.
29
 The 
shareholder argued that Congress lacked authority to create these securities, 
and thus any investment in them by Kansas City Title & Trust would 
constitute a misappropriation of corporate funds.
30
 The Supreme Court 
ruled that the federal courts had proper subject matter jurisdiction because, 
while the plaintiff’s claim was created by state law, the shareholder could 
succeed only if he established that a congressional act violated the 
Constitution.
31
 The Court held that, to satisfy the substantial question 




A plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law only if the issue of federal 
law appears on the face of the well-pleaded complaint.
33
 
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of 
action shows that it is based upon those laws or that 
Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some 
anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the 
defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Gunn v. Minton, 568 
U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue 
is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution 
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”). 
 26. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).  
 27. Id. at 201–02. 
 28. Id. at 201. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 199–202. 
 32. Id.; see also Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 
858 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 33. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 17 
(1983). 
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the United States. Although such allegations show that very 
likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the 
Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, 




This precept is known as the well-pleaded complaint rule.
35
 Given 
jurisdictional restraints, it is vital for a plaintiff seeking relief in federal 
court to clearly establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; if the court 
decides at any phase of the proceedings it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 
it must dismiss the case.
36
 
III. Territorial Limitation of Legal Judgments and Enforcement 
in Foreign Forums 
Courts, whether state, federal, or tribal, have the power to make rulings 
only within the legal authority granted by the sovereign they serve.
37
 “No 
legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the 
sovereignty from which its authority is derived.”
38
 Of course, the physical 
limitations of a sovereign government are its territorial borders.
39
 While a 
government’s laws may be freely applied outside of its territory by the 
courts of other sovereigns, judicial rulings are limited to a sovereign’s 
physical territory.
40
 “No sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own 
territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial 
decision. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere 




Legal judgments come in various forms. In the most basic sense, a legal 
judgment is an order that must be satisfied by or executed against a person, 
                                                                                                             
 34. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. 
 35. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
 37. See Baskin v. Montedonico, 115 F.2d 837, 838 (6th Cir. 1940). 
 38. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 39. John Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in 
Contemporary World Politics, 95 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437, 437 
(2005) (“Implicit in all claims about state sovereignty as the quintessential form taken by 
political authority are associated claims about distinguishing a strictly bounded territory 
from an external world and thus fixing the territorial scope of sovereignty.”). 
 40. See Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908); see also Baskin, 115 F.2d at 
838.  
 41. Baskin, 115 F.2d at 838 (citations omitted). 
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entity, or property. One important fundamental principle of legal judgments 
against defendants in civil cases is that they presuppose property within the 
court’s jurisdiction to satisfy such judgments.
42
 When a defendant lacks 
recoverable assets within the court’s jurisdiction, the court cannot extend its 
reach to seize those assets located outside its jurisdiction.
43
 “Enforcement of 
a judgment . . . does not become possible until the defendant or the 
defendant’s property can be found within the enforcing forum . . . .”
44
  
So, what is a plaintiff to do after a valid judgment is entered against a 
defendant who is not present and has no property or recoverable assets in 
the ruling court’s jurisdiction? In this scenario, a plaintiff must locate the 
jurisdiction that has the authority to enforce an identical judgment against 
the defendant.
45
 Once the proper forum is located, the plaintiff must file a 
new lawsuit to domesticate and enforce the judgment, unless an existing 
treaty or law binds the new forum to honor the judgment.
46
 The new forum 
will review the original judgment to assess its authenticity and the 
consequences of enforcing it against the defendant.
47
  
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires state 
courts to recognize and enforce judgments from courts sitting in other states 
as long as the ruling court had proper jurisdiction.
48
 However, federal courts 
have determined that tribal courts are not afforded full faith and credit 
under the U.S. Constitution and other federal statutes.
49
 Thus, tribal court 
judgments are not automatically recognized, regardless of their 
jurisdiction.
50
 Instead, federal courts review tribal court judgments under 
the doctrine of comity.
51
  
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own 
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. 
                                                                                                             
 42. George Rutherglen & James Y. Stern, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES 
LEGAL SYSTEM 13, 14–15 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014). 
 43. See id. at 15. 
 44. Id. at 14. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 16. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 
U.S.C. § 1738. 
49. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Full faith and credit is 
not extended to tribal judgments by the Constitution or Congressional act, and we decline to 
extend it judicially.”). 
 50. Id. at 810. 
 51. Id. 
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It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and 
expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and 
accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an 
imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation’s expression of 
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to 
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons 
protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when 
its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of 
the nation called upon to give it effect.
52
 
Federal courts will never recognize tribal court judgments if the tribal court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or “if the 
defendant was not afforded due process of law.”
53
 Comity is also the 
method the Supreme Court decided federal courts should use to determine 
whether to enforce a judgment from a court in a foreign country.
54
 This 
doctrine gives courts broad discretion in ruling on the enforcement of 
foreign judgments; even if the foreign judgment is one which is usually 




IV. Significant Law Before Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the particular issue presented in 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe and discussed in this Note; however, the Court’s 
holding in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribes of 
Indians in 1985 is instructive in determining whether federal courts have 
the power to enforce tribal court judgments against nonmembers of the 
tribe.
56
 Before the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, only two 
U.S. Courts of Appeals had addressed whether there is federal question 
jurisdiction for actions of recognition and enforcement of tribal court 
judgments against nonmembers.  
Federal diversity jurisdiction was not available in Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
because Indian tribes, even those that are federally recognized, are not 
                                                                                                             
 52. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 53. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 482 (AM. L. INST. 1986)). 
 54. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 55. Rutherglen & Stern, supra note 42, at 20. 
 56. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
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citizens of any U.S. state.
57
 Thus, federal courts must make the preliminary 
determination of whether there is jurisdiction in tribal court judgment 
recognition cases based upon a finding of an issue of federal law. In 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co., the 
Eleventh Circuit held that suits for recognition of tribal court judgments 
implicate no federal issue.
58
 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in MacArthur v. 
San Juan County disagreed and ruled that an issue of federal law does exist 
in these kinds of recognition suits.
59
  
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe deems its sovereignty as inherent and endowed 
by its Creator.
60
 “Tribal Sovereignty flows through American history in a 
timeless river, without beginning or end.”
61
 The federal government did not 
create tribal authority, but it nonetheless endures at the will of Congress.
62
 
Today, “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not 
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.”
63
 Thus, to determine the legitimacy of any exercise 
of tribal authority over a nonmember, courts must examine the aspects of 
sovereignty the tribe has retained.
64
  
A. National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians 
In National Farmers, the Supreme Court held that, since federal law 
circumscribes tribal sovereignty, the question of whether a tribe properly 
exercised its civil jurisdiction over nonmembers raised a federal question. 
This case concerned the validity of a tribal court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over parties who were not members of the ruling tribe.
65
 A member of the 
Crow Tribe sued a Montana school district in tribal court to recover 
damages he suffered after he was struck by a motorcycle in the school 
                                                                                                             
 57. Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“First, as dependent domestic sovereign nations, Indian tribes are not state citizens. 
Second, despite ample opportunity, Congress has not seen fit to confer state citizenship on 
Indian tribes. Finally, because our holding is consistent with every other circuit to address 
this issue, we advance the interest of uniformity in a uniquely federal area of law.”). 
 58. 607 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 59. 497 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 60. Sovereignty, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/our-tribe/ 
sovereignty (last visited Jan 3, 2020). 
 61. Id. 
 62. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56 
(1985). 
 65. Id. at 852. 
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 The land on which the injury occurred is within the Crow 
Tribe Reservation, but is owned by the State of Montana.
67
 The school 
district never appeared in the tribal court action and, consequently, the 
Crow Tribal Court entered a default judgment in favor of the Tribe 
member.
68
 To prevent the execution of this judgment, the school district and 
its insurer filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana arguing that the Crow Tribal Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over an accident occurring on non-tribal land.
69
 The 
court eventually granted a permanent injunction against the execution of the 
tribal court judgment.
70
 It held the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the 
tort because the injury did not occur on tribal land and Congress did not 
delegate to the Crow Tribal Court the power to hear this case.
71
  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and, ironically, 
concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render 
the permanent injunction.
72
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision rested first on the 
determination that tribal courts are not constrained by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; thus, the school district’s due process and equal protection 
claims did not arise under the Constitution.
73
 Next, the court discussed 
whether the school district’s claim that the tribal court violated the Indian 
Civil Rights Act,
74
 conferred federal question jurisdiction.
75
 “The ICRA 
requires tribal courts to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner consistent 
with due process and equal protection.”
76
 The Supreme Court, however, has 
determined that “[a] civil suit to enjoin violations of the ICRA is not 
cognizable in federal court.”
77
 Refusing to follow the school district’s 
contentions, the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether a tribal 
court has violated its adjudicatory authority does not raise an issue of 
federal common law, implicating federal question jurisdiction.
78
 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. at 847. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 848–49. 
 70. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 560 F. Supp. at 218. 
 71. See id. at 217. 
 72. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 849.  
 73. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 74. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341. 
 75. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 736 F.2d at 1322.  
 76. Id. at 1322–23 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8)). 
 77. Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 463 U.S. 49, 67–70 (1978)). 
 78. Id. at 1323. 
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that assessing 
the validity of Indian Tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers “involves a 
careful examination of Tribal sovereignty and the extent to which that 
sovereignty has been divested.”
79
 It further asserted that federal law divests 
the Crow Tribe of the sovereignty supporting its default judgment.
80
 The 
Court agreed in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens.
81
 Stevens reasoned 
that, since federal law “defines the outer boundaries of an Indian tribe’s 
power over non-Indians,” it must be analyzed to determine whether an 
Indian tribal court has properly exercised its civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.
82
 Therefore, the Court found that the federal district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether the 
Crow Tribal Court exceeded its jurisdictional authorization when it 
rendered its default judgment.
83
 The Court stated that all tribal court 
remedies must be exhausted before a federal district court will have 
jurisdiction to make any determination or grant any remedy.
84
 As a result, 
the case was remanded to the district court for a determination of whether 
all Crow Tribal Court remedies were exhausted.
85
 
B. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co. 
In 2010, in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson 
Construction Co., the Eleventh Circuit heard a case brought to the federal 
courts by a plaintiff-tribe seeking recognition and enforcement of a tribal 
court judgment.
86
 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians involved a contract dispute 
between the Miccosukee Tribe and a company hired to construct multiple 
buildings on the Tribe’s reservation.
87
 Unlike National Farmers, where the 
party that first introduced the tribal court judgment to the U.S federal courts 
was seeking protection from its execution, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
involved a tribe seeking domestication and enforcement of a tribal court 
judgment.
88
 The Tribe originally sued the company in Miccosukee Tribal 
                                                                                                             
 79. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
471 U.S. 845 (1985) (No. 84-320), 1985 WL 670173, at *7. 
 80. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852–53 
(1985). 
 81. Id. at 847–53. 
 82. Id. at 851–52. 
 83. Id. at 857. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 607 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 87. Id. at 1270–72. 
 88. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 848. 
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Court and, after a sixteen day bench trial, the tribal court ruled for the Tribe 
and awarded it $1,654,988.88 in damages.
89
 The construction company then 
exhausted the available review process through an appeal that was denied 
by the Miccosukee Business Council.
90
  
Because the construction company refused to pay the award, the Tribe 
sued in federal court to enforce and recover on the tribal court judgment.
91
 
The district court held that an Indian tribe’s claim for the federal 
recognition of tribal court judgments presents a question of federal common 
law, so the court had proper subject matter jurisdiction.
92
 But the court 
refused to recognize and enforce the tribal court judgment under the 
doctrine of comity “because the Business Council was an interested party in 
the litigation and its disallowance of [the construction company’s] appeal 
constituted a denial of due process.”
93
  
The Tribe appealed the district court decision to the Eleventh Circuit.
94
 
At the outset of every federal appeal, an appellate court will assess whether 
the trial court had valid jurisdiction to render the decision on appeal.
95
 Even 
if the parties agree that federal subject matter jurisdiction is present, as in 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the appellate court must confirm Congress has 
authorized the lower court to hear the particular suit.
96
 In fulfillment of this 
obligation, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provided 
no basis for federal jurisdiction over the Miccosukee Tribe’s suit; thus, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the case should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.
97
 The court recognized that the Supreme Court in 
National Farmers found an issue of federal law in a case where the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction was at issue.
98
 But the Eleventh Circuit distinguished 
National Farmers on the basis that the Miccosukee Tribe and the non-tribal 
defendant agreed the tribal court possessed valid jurisdiction to make its 
judgment.
99
 The Tribe was only willing to waive its sovereign immunity if 
the construction company agreed to adjudicate all claims in the Miccosukee 
Tribal Court System; thus, the contract contained a forum selection 
                                                                                                             
 89. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 607 F.3d at 1271–72. 
 90. Id. at 1272. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)). 
 96. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). 
 97. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 607 F.3d at 1275–77. 
 98. Id. at 1275. 
 99. Id. 
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 The court reasoned that the issue of tribal sovereignty—the 
basis for federal question jurisdiction in National Farmers—was not 
present in this case.
101
 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “[a] suit to 
domesticate a tribal judgment does not state a claim under federal law, 
whether statutory or common law.”
102
 
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that suits brought to federal court 
to enforce tribal court judgments present a federal issue sufficient to 
support the exercise of jurisdiction.
103
 This is especially true “in cases 
encompassing the federal question whether a tribal court has exceeded its 
lawful limits of jurisdiction involving an exercise of civil subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”
104
 In such cases, “the federal district court is empowered to 
review a tribal court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”
105
 In the Tenth 
Circuit, tribal court judgments are reviewed under the doctrine of comity.
106
 
The court analyzes whether to extend comity to the tribal court judgment, 
but has held that under two conditions the court can never extend comity: 
(1) when the tribal court lacked proper jurisdiction (personal or subject 
matter), or (2) when the tribal court failed to afford due process of law to 
the party against whom the judgment was asserted.
107
 
C. Wilson v. Marchington 
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit examined “whether, and under what 
circumstances, a tribal court tort judgment is entitled to recognition in the 
United States Courts.”
108
 Wilson v. Marchington involved a negligence suit 
brought by a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe against a nonmember.
109
 
At issue in Wilson was an automobile accident which occurred on a 
Montana state highway within the Blackfeet Indian Tribe Reservation 
when, while the plaintiff was attempting to turn left and exit the highway, 
the defendant maneuvered his tractor trailer to pass the plaintiff on her 
left.
110
 Having sustained significant injuries, the tribe member plaintiff sued 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at 1271. 
 101. Id. at 1275. 
 102. Id. 
 103. MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007) 
 104. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 105. Id. 
 106. MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1066. 
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the truck driver and his employer in the Blackfeet Indian Tribal Court.
111
 
Explicitly reserving all jurisdictional objections, the defendants appeared in 
the tribal court action to defend against the plaintiff’s claims.
112
 Ultimately, 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
113
 After multiple appeals at the 
tribal court level, the plaintiff then brought the tribal court verdict to federal 
court to be recognized and enforced.
114
 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and 
the defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
115
 
Without expressly identifying the issue of federal law that would support 
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, both the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit rendered judgments on the merits.
116
 First, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to extend the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
recognize tribal court judgments; the court noted that such an extension 
would be proper only if done legislatively.
117
 Instead, the court ruled that 
tribal court judgments should be reviewed and, if appropriate, recognized in 
U.S. federal courts under the doctrine of comity.
118
  
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the existence of subject matter 
jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry in virtually every federal examination of a 
tribal judgment.”
119
 Ultimately, the tribal court subject matter analysis led 
the court to refuse the enforcement of the judgment.
120
 Under Supreme 
Court precedent, tribal courts do not have authority to make judgments 
against nonmembers in cases involving automobile accidents on state 
highways, even if the accident occurred within an Indian reservation.
121
 
Because the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit 
denied the recognition and enforcement of the judgment in favor of the 
Blackfeet Indian Tribe member.
122
  
                                                                                                             
 111. See id. 
 112. Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. Mont. 1995). 
 113. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 805; see Wilson, 934 F. Supp. 1176. 
 117. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 811. 
 120. Id. at 815. 
 121. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (“[T]ribal courts may not 
entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a 
statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway 
in question.”). 
 122. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 815. 
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V. Statement of the Case: Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks 
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with over 
2190 enrolled members that once claimed over 3.5 million acres of what is 
now northern Idaho.
123
 Today, the Tribe’s sovereign authority spans over a 
345,000-acre reservation.
124
 Within the Coeur d’Alene Reservation are 
portions of land submerged by Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River.
125
 
The Tribe expresses great interest in preserving and protecting its waters.
126
 
It states the intent behind its water regulation this way: 
Although the Coeur d’Alene Tribe has the right of exclusive use 
and occupancy and to exclude non-Tribal member uses of the 
waters and submerged lands within the Reservation, the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe may permit non-Tribal members the privilege to 
use these waters and submerged lands in certain specific, well-
defined ways. This non-Tribal member use is by permission only 
and is to be narrowly construed.
127
 
Steve and Deanne Hawks, who are not members of the Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, own property along the submerged land possessed by the Tribe.
128
 
Without the consent of the Tribe, the Hawkses installed a boat garage that 
extended from their property into the river.
129
 According to the Tribe, the 
Hawkses directly violated Coeur d’Alene tribal law, which prohibits “[a]ll 
encroachments on Tribal submerged lands and waters . . . unless there is a 
solid permit and lease currently in effect for the encroachment.”
130
 The 
Tribe sued the Hawkses in Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court for violating the 
tribal law.
131
 The Hawkses failed to appear before the tribal court; 
consequently, the tribal court entered a default judgment against them.
132
 
The judgment charged the Hawkses with a $3900 penalty and declared the 
Tribe had authority to remove the boat garage.
133
 
                                                                                                             
 123. History, supra note 3; Idaho v. United States, 553 U.S. 262, 265 (2001). 
 124. History, supra note 3. 
 125. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 126. Lake Management, supra note 1. 
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nsn.gov/lake/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2020/03/Chapter-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGK2-
N5CA]. 
 128. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054. 
 129. Id. 
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The Coeur d’Alene Tribe, seeking federal recognition and enforcement 
of the tribal court judgment, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Idaho.
134
 It was then, for the first time, that the Hawkses 
appeared to defend themselves by moving to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.
135
 They argued the Tribe’s federal suit did not place 
tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty at issue; instead, the couple argued, the 
Tribe was only seeking federal enforcement of a tribal judgment.
136
 It was 
the Hawkses’ position that a federal court would have the authority granted 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to rule on an issue of tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants, but the analysis for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s 
federal claim would not involve such an issue because all the Tribe sought 
was recognition and enforcement of a judgment.
137
 The district court agreed 
and, “[h]aving found ‘no federal statute or law . . . in dispute,’ the district 
court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
138
 In 
support of its ruling, the court relied heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.
139
 Just like the Eleventh Circuit 
held, it was the district court’s position that there could be a federal issue in 
cases involving tribal court judgments only if the tribal court’s jurisdiction 
is challenged by one party.
140
 
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
141
 The issue on 
appeal was “whether the grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 encompasses an action to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s 
award against nonmembers of the tribe.”
142
 On appeal, the Tribe abandoned 
enforcement of the Hawkses’ $3900 judgment because the fine was penal in 
nature, and courts do not impose the penal laws of another sovereign.
143
 
The Tribe, however, still sought the recognition and enforcement of the 
ruling of the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court judgment that entitled the Tribe to 
remove the Hawkses’ encroaching boat garage.
144
 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay at 3, Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 
933 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 2:16-cv-00366-BLW), 2016 WL 9344143. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, No. 
2:16-CV-366-BLW, 2017 WL 3699347, at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2017)).  
 139. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 2017 WL 3699347, at *2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054. 
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Judge Richard Clifton authored the decision for the Ninth Circuit. From 
the outset of the opinion, Judge Clifton recognized the court’s limited 
jurisdiction and inability to expand such jurisdiction by way of judicial 
decree.
145
 The party asserting jurisdiction must convince the court that the 
case at hand properly fits into the few categories Congress has authorized 
federal courts to adjudicate; the court will always begin its analysis with a 
presumption that the present case is outside its limited jurisdiction.
146
 Since 
there is no constitutional provision or federal statute that creates the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe’s claim for the recognition and enforcement of its judgment 
against the Hawkses, it was the Tribe’s burden to prove that the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit had the authority to make valid judgments.
147
 
Therefore, the Tribe had to establish that the case “depend[ed] on the 
necessary presence of a substantial question of federal law.”
148
 
The court accordingly examined whether the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s 
claim necessarily depended on an issue of federal law.
149
 A substantial issue 
of federal law does not exist based merely on the involvement of a federal 
Indian tribe in litigation.
150
 Further, the Supreme Court has clarified there is 
no “general ‘federal common law of Indian affairs.’”
151
 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit needed to “articulate a specific rule of federal common law under 
which the Tribe’s case arises” to identify a substantial issue of federal law 
that would support the exercise of jurisdiction.
152
  
To satisfy this standard, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe proffered a rule of 
federal common law under which its claim arose: congressional limitations 
on tribal sovereignty over nonmembers.
153
 Tribal authority was not created 
by federal law and “[a]t one time [tribes] exercised virtually unlimited 
power over their own members as well as those who were permitted to join 
their communities.”
154
 But throughout the history of the United States, 
Congress has placed limits on Indian tribes’ sovereignty and, today, “the 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1055 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 
463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983)). 
 149. Id. at 1055–56. 
 150. Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 
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 151. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1055 (quoting Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute-Shoshone 
Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003)). 
 152. Id. 
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power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary.”
155
 
Since federal law constrains and circumscribes the outer boundaries of 
Indian tribal authority over nonmembers,
156
 “the question of ‘whether a 




The Hawkses countered by arguing the district court’s dismissal for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction was proper for two reasons: (1) because the 
couple did not challenge the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court’s jurisdiction, and 
(2) because the Tribe did not seek a declaration by the district court that the 
tribal court properly exercised its jurisdiction.
158
 Thus, the Hawkses 
attacked the Tribe’s assertion that this recognition and enforcement suit 
presented a substantial issue of federal law.
159
 Since the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction to render its default judgment against the Hawkses was not 
disputed, the Hawkses’ claim cannot be the source of the federal issue that 
supports subject matter jurisdiction.
160
 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
161
 
The court held that “the Tribe’s action to enforce the Tribal Court’s 
judgment against a nonmember presents a substantial issue of federal 
law.”
162
 The Tribe’s federal action depended entirely on the determination 
of whether applying tribal law in the ruling against the Hawkses was 
proper, given the limits placed by Congress on the Tribe’s sovereignty over 
nonmembers.
163
 “[A] federal question inhered in the Tribe’s complaint 
because in order to impose its policy, embodied in a declaration by its 
judiciary, it will inevitably be forced to establish its authority to do so under 
federal common or statutory law.”
164
  
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe was “‘pressing the outer boundaries’ of its 
authority over nonmembers” when it applied Coeur d’Alene Tribal Law to 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. 
 156. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1055–56; Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. 
at 851. 
 157. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. 
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008)). 
 158. Appellee’s Brief at 8, Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052 (2019) (No. 
17-35755), 2017 WL 6550777 at *8. 
 159. Id. at 7–8, 2017 WL 6550777, at *7–8. 
 160. Id. at 8, 2017 WL 6550777, at *8. 
 161. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1057. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 1058. 
 164. Id. at 1060. 
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 The Tribe further tested these boundaries when it sought 
federal recognition and enforcement of its tribal court judgment against the 
Hawkses.
166
 As the Supreme Court clarified in National Farmers, federal 
law defines the confines of tribal authority over nonmembers.
167
 
Determining tribal court jurisdiction is an incredibly complex task that 
requires courts to assess the implications of numerous legal and political 
actions taken by the federal government.
168
 
[T]he existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will 
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to 
which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, 
as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch 




To determine whether the district court should recognize and enforce the 
tribal court judgment, it is first necessary to determine whether the Tribe 
proceeded appropriately within these limits of tribal sovereignty over 
nonmembers set by federal law.
170
 The Ninth Circuit placed a limitation on 
further application of the holding in Coeur d’Alene Tribe by confining the 
holding to the facts presented: “a tribe seeking to enforce a tribal court 




The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Coeur d’Alene Tribe is sound and 
should be followed in all federal courts. Further, at least two of the 
justifications for federal question jurisdiction—“experience . . . and hope of 
uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues”
172
—are satisfied by 
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the federal courts’ exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over cases in 
which tribes seek recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments 
against nonmembers. Assuring the consideration of these tribal court 
judgments in federal court will simultaneously legitimize tribal court 
proceedings and protect nonmembers from potentially unfair tribal court 
proceedings. 
The Ninth Circuit correctly found a federal issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
because resolving the Tribe’s claim requires a complex survey of the 
history and relationship between the federal government and the Tribe. 
Here, the court looked beyond the label of the Tribe’s claim—a judgment 
recognition suit—to the actual task the court had to undertake to rule on the 
claim. Federal courts determine whether tribal court judgments will be 
recognized under the doctrine of comity.
173
 Before a court can extend 
comity to a tribal court judgment, it must first conclude that the tribal court 
had both subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.
174
 This analysis will necessarily involve an 
examination of how much sovereignty the Coeur d’Alene Tribe retains over 
nonmembers. Because federal law defines the outer limits of tribal authority 
over nonmembers, federal law will be the focal point of this examination.
175
 
Thus, a federal issue sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional authorization in 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 is present in Coeur d’Alene Tribe and will be present in 
future suits for the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments 
against nonmembers. 
Perhaps an effective manner to assess the reasoning in Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe is to contrast the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians. Both decisions discuss the 
consequential holding in National Farmers; however, the two Circuit 
Courts of Appeals disagree as to the appropriate scope of the Supreme 
Court’s holding. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
holding in National Farmers narrowly, while the Ninth Circuit opted for a 
broader interpretation.
176
 Even though the facts of these two cases are not 
identical, both cases involve a tribe seeking the recognition and 
                                                                                                             
recognition suits, state courts are able to fairly and carefully review tribal court judgment 
recognition suits. See, e.g., Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho 2017). 
 173. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 174. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 
(AM. L. INST. 1986)). 
 175. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985). 
 176. Compare Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1059, with Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
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enforcement of a tribal court judgment. The most consequential difference 
between the cases is the conditional forum selection clause in Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians.  
The Eleventh Circuit described the decision in National Farmers as 
holding “that a dispute over tribal court jurisdiction is considered a dispute 
over tribal sovereignty, and therefore—like a dispute over tribal 
sovereignty—is a matter of federal law to which § 1331 applies.”
177
 Since 
the parties in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians agreed to resolve their disputes 
in tribal court, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned there was no dispute over 
tribal court jurisdiction, and thus no federal issue.
178
 By requiring a dispute 
between the parties over the tribal court’s jurisdiction, the court seems to 
implicitly conclude that the parties in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians could 
enlarge the power of tribal courts, including tribal authority over 
nonmembers, by contractually agreeing to litigate in the tribal court 
systems. This contradicts the Supreme Court’s declaration that tribal 
authority over nonmembers is defined by federal law.
179
 
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the Ninth Circuit properly applied a less-
constrained interpretation of the holding in National Farmers. The Supreme 
Court articulated that “[t]he question whether an Indian tribe retains the 
power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil 
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to 
federal law and is a ‘federal question’ under § 1331.”
180
 The Ninth Circuit 
accurately decided this question must be answered regardless of which 
party makes the first move to bring the tribal court judgment to the attention 
of a federal court. Further, the Ninth Circuit realized that the question from 
National Farmers must still be answered even if the parties agree, or at 
least do not dispute, that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction to render 
the judgment. 
The Supreme Court, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, provided the justifications for the 
jurisdictional authorization in § 1331.
181
 These justifications show that 
while many state courts can properly adjudicate federal claims, a federal 
forum for these claims is optimal. First, federal question jurisdiction is 
necessary because federal forums possess greater experience analyzing and 
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 Experience and expertise in applying federal law is 
vital for tribal court judgment recognition suits because the process for 
determining whether a tribal court judgment should be enforced under the 
doctrine of comity involves an extremely complex analysis of federal 
statutes, treaties, and administrative law.
183
 Federal courts are in the best 
position to make these convoluted analyses of federal law because of the 
accrued experience of deciding federal claims.
184
 Federal question 
jurisdiction is also necessary for the “hope of uniformity that a federal 
forum offers on federal issues.”
185
 State courts and their judges greatly 
outnumber their federal counterparts; “[t]he judiciaries of fifty states (plus 
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) are, it is argued, likely to spawn 
greater interpretive variance than the thirteen U.S. courts of appeals.”
186
 
Although there is not current uniformity among the three federal circuits 
regarding claims such as Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s, there is much greater 
potential for realizing this “hope of uniformity”
187
 in the federal court 
system. A uniform approach to the recognition of tribal court judgments 
will promote equal treatment of Indian tribes throughout the United States. 
Consistent and equal treatment of tribes is crucial for the continued 
legitimacy of tribal sovereignty for all tribes.  
Under National Farmers, nonmember defendants may challenge tribal 
court judgments in federal court.
188
 The Supreme Court has established that 
such a claim presents an issue of federal law to satisfy § 1331.
189
 By ruling 
that the recognition and enforcement claim in Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
presented a substantial issue of federal law, the Ninth Circuit avoided a 
legal injustice to the Tribe. This legal injustice, which is currently present in 
                                                                                                             
 182. See id. 
 183. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 855–56. 
 184. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A 
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 
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the Eleventh Circuit, rears itself by granting nonmember defendants like the 
Hawkses access to the federal courts to challenge a tribal court judgment 
while shutting the doors of the federal courts to Indian tribes, preventing 
them from bringing a parallel claim seeking recognition of the same tribal 
court judgment. One of the foundational principles of the federal judicial 
system is equality of access to the federal courts for all parties in a legal 
matter.
190
 As Justice Joseph Story stated in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee: 
The constitution of the United States was designed for the 
common and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. 
The judicial power was granted for the same benign and salutary 
purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of 
parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national 
forum, but also for the protection of defendants who might be 
entitled to try their rights, or assert their priviliges [sic], before 
the same forum. Yet, if the construction contended for be 
correct, it will follow, that as the plaintiff may always elect the 
state court, the defendant may be deprived of all the security 
which the constitution intended in aid of his rights. Such a state 




By avoiding this legal injustice, the Ninth Circuit ensured that all parties 
share equal rights to a federal forum in suits involving tribal court 
judgments against nonmember defendants. Equal access to federal courts is 
imperative for a fair and just judicial system and is accomplished by the 
decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  
The Ninth Circuit’s Coeur d’Alene Tribe decision will have numerous 
positive consequences. First, this decision will legitimize tribal court 
proceedings. Tribal courts, at least those in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 
should be on notice that their decisions in cases involving nonmember 
defendants can be reviewed by the U.S. federal courts. This will not only 
incentivize a transparent and fair process in tribal court cases, but it will 
also incentivize nonmember defendants to appear at tribal courts to present 
a defense on the merits. Second, nonmember defendants can take comfort 
in the fact that any tribal court judgment issued against them can be 
reviewed by a federal court under the doctrine of comity. Thus, a tribal 
court judgment will never be enforced by a federal court if the tribal court 
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lacked jurisdiction or if the defendant was denied due process of law.
192
 
This means that, even before tribal courts, nonmember defendants will still 
enjoy due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The decision to 
find a substantial question of federal law in Coeur d’Alene will benefit the 
tribal courts’ legal process without depriving nonmember defendants of any 
of their legal protections. 
VII. Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit properly decided that an action to recognize and 
enforce a tribal court’s award against nonmembers falls within the grant of 
federal question jurisdiction afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe’s sovereignty has existed since time immemorial; it “flows 
through American history in a timeless river, without beginning or end.”
193
 
But that inherent sovereignty is not unlimited, assuredly so in regard to 
nonmembers. The federal government and the American Indian tribes have 
a long, complicated history. Because of this “unique relationship with 
Indian tribes,”
194
 federal courts have the power to hear claims for the 
recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments against nonmember 
defendants. 
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